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ABSTRACT 
Quality and Location Choices under Price Regulation  
by Kurt R. Brekke, Robert Nuscheler and Odd Rune Straume* 
In a model of spatial competition, we analyse the equilibrium outcomes in markets 
where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling 
model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they 
supply. We derive the optimal price set by a welfarist regulator and find that this 
(second-best) price causes over-investment in quality and an insufficient degree of 
horizontal differentiation (compared with the first-best solution) if the cost of investing 
in product quality, or the transportation cost of consumers, is sufficiently high. By 
comparing the case of price competition, we also identify a hitherto unnoticed benefit of 
regulation, namely improved locational efficiency. 
 
Keywords:  Spatial competition, product quality, location, price regulation 
JEL classification numbers: L13, L50, R30, R38 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Qualitäts- und Standortwahl bei Preisregulierung  
In einem räumlichen Wettbewerbsmodell untersuchen wir die Gleichgewichte, die sich 
bei exogen gegebenem Preis einstellen. In einem erweiterten Hotelling Modell 
unterstellen wir, dass die Firmen den Standort (Produktdifferenzierung) und die Qualität 
ihres Produktes wählen. Wir ermitteln den, aus der Sicht eines sozialen Planers, 
optimalen Preis. Es zeigt sich, dass dieser (zweitbeste) Preis im Vergleich zum 
effizienten Ergebnis zu einer Überinvestition in Qualität und zu einer unzureichenden 
Produktdifferenzierung führt, wenn die Qualitätskosten der Firmen oder die Transport-
kosten der Konsumenten hinreichend groß sind. Ein Vergleich mit dem Marktergebnis 
bei Preiswettbewerb offenbart einen bisher unbeachteten positiven Effekt der 
Preisregulierung, den verbesserten Grad der Produktdifferenzierung. 
                                                 
*
  We are indebted to Frode Meland, Jan Erik Askildsen, Ching-to Albert Ma, Lars Sørgard and seminar 
participants at the Third European Workshop in Health Economics, Marseilles 2002, for helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the strategic interaction between horizontal diﬀerentiation and the
supply of quality in markets which are subject to price regulation. Imperfect competition
does not generally guarantee an optimal supply of quality or locational eﬃciency. This
could provide a rationale for regulation. In the present paper we characterise the opti-
mal regulated price in markets where ﬁrms compete along both vertical and horizontal
dimensions.
It is well known that the market cannot always be relied upon to supply a socially
eﬃcient level of product quality. This is illustrated within a monopoly framework in a
seminal paper by Spence (1975).1 Introducing competition between ﬁrms, Ma and Burgess
(1993) identify another potential ineﬃciency caused by the strategic interaction between
quality and price competition that will generally lead to sub-optimal product quality.
When quality and price decisions are made sequentially, ﬁrms will under-invest in quality
in order to dampen price competition. A regulator can then make the ﬁrms commit to a
higher level of product quality by eliminating price competition.
In imperfectly competitive markets, though, an important part of the strategic in-
teraction among ﬁrms also takes place along a spatial dimension. It is well known that
the location choices of ﬁrms, interpreted in either geographical space or product space,
are highly dependent on whether or not prices are regulated. For instance, Anderson
and Engers (1994) show that price-taking ﬁrms will agglomerate at the market centre
in a spatial duopoly if demand is suﬃciently inelastic, a result which corresponds with
Hotelling’s (1929) prediction of minimum diﬀerentiation.2 On the other hand, if ﬁrms are
allowed to compete in prices they can reduce competition by locating further apart. In
another seminal contribution, D’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that, under certain condi-
1The incentive to provide quality is related to the marginal willingness to pay for quality, for the
marginal consumer in the case of a proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm, and for the average consumer in the case of
a social planner. Depending on the diﬀerence between the consumers’ marginal and average valuations,
the supply of quality may be higher or lower than the social optimum.
2In a related paper, Hinloopen (2002) analyses the location choices of ﬁrms in a price regulated spatial
duopoly where consumers’ reservation prices may bind in equilibrium.
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tions, price competition induces the ﬁrms to locate at either extreme of the Hotelling-line;
a result often referred to as the ‘Principle of Maximum Diﬀerentiation’. From a welfare
point of view, it is clear that neither location at the market centre nor location at the
market borders is desirable.
The case of location-quality competition has received relatively little attention in the
literature, and is therefore less understood. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
interaction between location and quality choices made by competing ﬁrms facing a ﬁxed
product price, and to explore welfare implications and optimal regulation of prices in such
markets. To do so we employ the following three-stage spatial duopoly model: ﬁrst, a
welfarist regulator sets the price of the product (or the third party payment). Second, the
ﬁrms choose location, or specialisation, of their product on the ‘unconstrained’ Hotelling-
line. Third, the ﬁrms invest in quality before the consumers decide which product to
purchase.
A prime example of where the situation analysed in this paper applies is the health
care market. In response to the peculiarities of medical services or, more generally, health
goods, compensation of health care suppliers is, in most countries, set by some regula-
tory authority. In the absence of price as a strategic variable, proﬁt maximising health
care suppliers will resort to other variables to increase proﬁts. As a patient’s decision
about which supplier to use crucially depends on the (perceived) quality levels provided
and on the specialisations chosen, suppliers will set quality (vertical diﬀerentiation) and
specialisation (horizontal diﬀerentiation) strategically.3 The horizontal dimension could
also be interpreted in the geographical sense. Consider two physicians providing the same
quality of care. A patient would then simply consult the medical practice closer to where
he lives.4
3The market for prescription drugs may also serve as an example. In this market, drug prices are often
regulated by the government, at least in most European countries, and pharmaceutical ﬁrms compete for
consumers in terms of vertical and horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
4Considering the market for primary care, the geographical interpretation of ‘distance’ is perhaps the
most relevant. However, for secondary care we may think of distance as a measure of horizontal product
diﬀerentiation. For instance, Calem and Rizzo (1995) interprete location choice as hospitals choosing a
speciality mix, with the Hotelling-line reﬂecting patients’ preferences over diﬀerent service mixes.
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Our main ﬁndings are the following: ﬁrst, a higher price will increase the equilibrium
level of quality, but it will also induce the ﬁrms to locate further apart. The higher
the price-cost margin, the higher the beneﬁts, in terms of proﬁts, of capturing a larger
share of the market, and this induces the ﬁrms to compete more intensively on quality.
However, ﬁrms have then an incentive to locate further apart in order to dampen quality
competition. Second, we ﬁnd that, if the cost of investing in product quality or the
consumers’ transportation cost is suﬃciently high, the optimal (second-best) price causes
over-investment in quality and an insuﬃcient degree of diﬀerentiation compared with the
ﬁrst-best outcome.
By comparing the case of price competition, we are also able to identify a second source
of ineﬃciency that provides an additional argument for the desirability of regulating prices.
In our model, regulation will not only yield a higher supply of quality, but it will also
generally lead to improved locational eﬃciency.
Finally, we also brieﬂy consider the case of partial commitment, where the regulator
is not able to commit to a price before locational decisions are made. Optimal regulation
in this regime yields an eﬃcient supply of quality but too much diﬀerentiation.
This paper relates to the following literature: the paper by Ma and Burgess (1993)
shows that price regulation reduces ineﬃciencies in the provision of quality in a spatial
duopoly. Wolinsky (1997) extends the former study both in terms of optimal market
regime (managed competition versus regulated monopolies) and asymmetric information.
However, in both studies locations are exogenous, and thus the interaction between quality
and location is not investigated.
Economides (1989) considers both quality and location choices under price competi-
tion, while Bester (1998) analyses the eﬀect of imperfect information about quality on
ﬁrms’ location choices in a similar model. Price regulation, however, is not an issue in
either paper.
Two other related papers applied to health care markets are Gravelle (2000) and
Nuscheler (2002). In both cases, though, attention is directed towards entry of ﬁrms in
a circular model, which means that the distance between ﬁrms are determined by the
number of ﬁrms entering the market, so the focus of these papers are quite diﬀerent from
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the present one in this respect. Finally, in a paper applied speciﬁcally to the hospital
market, Calem and Rizzo (1995) consider the interaction between location and quality
choices under the assumption that hospitals cover a fraction of their patients’ transporta-
tion costs. This paper diﬀers from ours in two important ways, though. Firstly, they do
not consider optimal regulation, which is a major issue in the present paper. Secondly,
the very particular assumptions in their model reduce its applicability beyond hospital
markets.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the main
ingredients of the model. In Section 3 we analyse the strategic relationship between quality
and location choices when the ﬁrms face an exogenous product price. In Section 4 we
derive the optimal regulated price and the corresponding equilibrium outcome, whereas a
comparison between competition and regulation is discussed in Section 5. In section 6 we
also brieﬂy consider the case of partial commitment. Finally, some concluding remarks
are oﬀered in Section 7.
2 The model
A unit mass of consumers is distributed uniformly on the line segment [0, 1]. Each of two
identical single-product ﬁrms, indexed by i = 1, 2, choose a location xi ∈ R and a quality
level qi ≥ 0. Both ﬁrms charge the same exogenous (regulated) price p for the product.5
Without loss of generality, we assume that x1 ≤ x2.
Each consumer demands one unit of the good. The utility derived by a consumer
located at z from getting a unit of the product from ﬁrm i is given by
(1) U (z, xi, qi) = v + qi − t (z − xi)2 − p.
This utility speciﬁcation implies that consumers always prefer higher quality. We assume
that the gross utility, v + qi, is always large enough for the whole market to be covered,
5Alternatively, we can think of this as the payment transferred from a third party (e.g. an insurer
or a governmental agency) to the ﬁrms. The analytical exposition is simpliﬁed by considering a single
price for both ﬁrms. Due to the symmetric nature of the model, the equilibrium outcome is obviously
not aﬀected by this simpliﬁcation.
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even at qi = 0. Given that v is assumed to be equal for all consumers, and that the two
ﬁrms charge the same price, the location z of the consumer who is indiﬀerent between
buying the product from either ﬁrm is the solution to
(2) q1 − t (z − x1)2 = q2 − t (x2 − z)2
and given by
(3) z =
1
2
(x1 + x2) +
q1 − q2
2t (x2 − x1) .
Let yi be the total demand facing ﬁrm i. With a uniform distribution of consumers,
the distribution of market shares between the two ﬁrms is given by y1 = z and y2 = 1− z.
The marginal cost of production, denoted c, is assumed to be constant and independent
of locations. The cost of achieving a quality level qi is determined by a quadratic cost
function C (qi) = kq
2
i , where k > 0.
6 The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is thus
(4) πi = (p− c) yi − kq2i , i = 1, 2.
We consider the following three-stage game:
Stage 1: The regulator sets a price p.
Stage 2: The ﬁrms simultaneously choose locations x1 and x2.
Stage 3: The ﬁrms simultaneously choose the quality levels q1 and q2.
This sequence of moves relies on the assumptions that (i) the regulator is able to pre-
commit to a regulatory policy,7 and (ii) choice of location is more of a long-term decision
than choice of product quality is.8
6The assumption that the ﬁrms’ costs are separable in quality and quantity implies that quality has
the characteristics of a public good for the consumers. This is a standard assumption in the literature
(see e.g. Economides, 1989, 1993; Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Gravelle and Masiero, 2000). Allowing also for
production-dependent quality costs mitigates the ineﬃciency in quality provision somewhat, but does not
qualitatively change the analysis. Due to analytical tractability, we focus on the special case of completely
production-independent quality costs.
7The assumption of commitment can be justiﬁed by a reputation argument. Commitment can also be
obtained by creating institutional mechanisms that makes it costly, or otherwise diﬃcult, to change the
regulated price. In Section 5 we will brieﬂy consider the case of partial commitment, where the regulator
is not able to commit to a price prior to location decisions.
8If location is interpreted in product space, the assumption that location decisions precede quality
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3 Equilibrium qualities and locations
We start out by deriving the Nash equilibrium outcome for a given price p, in order to
analyse how the ﬁrms’ choices of location and quality are determined by the regulated
price. As usual, the game is solved by backwards induction.
3.1 Quality competition
For a given pair of locations (x1, x2) and a given price p, ﬁrm i’s choice of quality is found
by maximising (4) with respect to qi, yielding
9
(5) q∗i (x1, x2, p) =
p− c
4tk∆
, i = 1, 2,
where
∆ ≡ x2 − x1.
The ﬁrst observation to be made is that the equilibrium levels of quality depend only
on relative locations, not on absolute ones. In other words, only the distance between the
ﬁrms, ∆, matters.10 Thus, the ﬁrms will always invest equally much in quality, even if they
are asymmetrically located. This is due to the absence of price competition. When prices
are exogenous, there is only a market share eﬀect of quality investments. By increasing
the level of quality, ﬁrm i is able to capture a larger share of the market by ‘pushing’
the indiﬀerent consumer in the direction of the rival ﬁrm. Since consumers are uniformly
distributed, this eﬀect does not depend on absolute locations.
The optimal level of quality is decreasing in the distance between the ﬁrms. This
is due to the convexity of transportation costs. From the viewpoint of either ﬁrm, the
decisions seems to be more logically consistent than the alternatives.
9The second-order conditions are satisﬁed since ∂
2πi
∂q2i
= −2k < 0 for i = 1, 2.
10From (5) we also see that q∗i → ∞ when ∆ → 0. This illustrates a special feature of quality
competition in this setting, namely that ﬁrms could earn negative proﬁts if they are located too close
together. In the two-stage equilibrium, where ﬁrms choose locations, this will only be the case if the
price-cost margin, p − c, is very large (cf. eq. (9)). A similar example of ruinous competition is found
by Calem and Rizzo (1995). In the equilibrium with optimal price regulation, to be derived later, this is
not a problem unless t or k is extremely small.
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further apart the ﬁrms are located, the smaller the market share captured by a marginal
increase in quality. Thus, diﬀerentiation softens quality competition. A similar kind of
argument applies for the negative relationship between q∗i and t. The more costly it is for
consumers to ‘travel’, the smaller the beneﬁts, in terms of increased market shares, for
either ﬁrm of investing in quality improvements. This implies that the local monopoly
power of ﬁrms increase as t increases.11
Obviously, the optimal level of quality also depends on the direct costs of quality
investments, and (5) conﬁrms the expected negative relationship between q∗i and the
cost parameter k. Finally, we also observe from (5) that the optimal level of quality is
increasing in the price level, p. With the assumption of constant marginal costs, this
result is quite intuitive. The higher the price-cost margin, the higher the beneﬁts, in
terms of proﬁts, of capturing a larger share of the market. Consequently, the stronger
is the incentive to increase the level of quality. Indeed, a positive price-cost margin is a
necessary condition for the ﬁrms to invest in quality. From (5) we see that q∗i = 0 for
p = c.
3.2 Location choice
At stage two of the game, the ﬁrms simultaneously choose their locations, anticipating the
quality pair (q∗1 (x1, x2, p) , q
∗
2 (x1, x2, p)) at the subsequent stage of the game. Inserting
(5) into (4), the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal location of ﬁrm 1 is given by
∂π1
∂x1
=
p− c
8
(
4− p− c
kt2∆3
)
= 0.
We are looking for a Nash equilibrium in symmetric locations. Setting x2 = 1−x1 (which
implies ∆ = 1− 2x1), the symmetric Nash equilibrium is given by12
(6) x∗1 (p) =
1
2
(1−∆∗)
11Note that an increase in t is equivalent to an increase in market size. If we use the product space
interpretation of horizontal diﬀerentiation, an increase in transportation costs can be interpreted as more
heterogeneous consumer preferences.
12The second order conditions are satisﬁed, since ∂
2πi
∂x2i
= − 38 (p−c)
2
kt2∆4 < 0. Note that, although this is the
unique symmetric equilibrium, there are also asymmetric equilibria. The ﬁrst-order conditions reveal the
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and
(7) x∗2 (p) =
1
2
(1 + ∆∗) ,
where
(8) ∆∗ ≡ x∗2 − x∗1 =
(
p− c
4t2k
) 1
3
.
An important observation is that quality competition induces the ﬁrms to locate apart.
In the absence of quality competition, we know that exogenous prices cause the ﬁrms to
agglomerate at the market centre. In this model, the absence of quality competition can
be thought of as prohibitively high investment costs. Indeed, from (8) it is conﬁrmed that
limk→∞∆∗ = 0. However, the possibility of quality-enhancing investments introduces a
degree of competition that the ﬁrms are able partly to avoid by locating away from each
other. The less costly it is to increase the quality of the product, i.e. the lower k is,
the stronger the incentives to avoid quality competition, and consequently, the larger the
distance between the ﬁrms in equilibrium. Furthermore, the higher the local monopoly
power of ﬁrms, i.e. the higher t, the smaller the diﬀerentiation incentives.
Inserting (8) into (5), the equilibrium levels of quality, for a given price level, are given
by
(9) q∗i (p) =
(
(p− c)2
16tk2
) 1
3
, i = 1, 2.
For exogenous prices, the comparative statics results for location and quality can be
summarised as follows:
Proposition 1 Both the equilibrium levels of quality and the equilibrium distance between
the ﬁrms are decreasing in k and t, and increasing in p.
existence of a continuum of equilibria with the same distance between the ﬁrms:
x∗1 = a ∈
(
1
2
−∆∗, 1
2
)
,
x∗2 = a+∆
∗.
The choice of the symmetric equilibrium can be justiﬁed by a focal point argument.
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Proof. Follows immediately from (8) and (9).
From the discussion of the last subsection, we know that an increase in the price level
will, ceteris paribus, induce the ﬁrms to increase quality, implying that the competition
between the ﬁrms intensiﬁes. The ﬁrms have incentives to dampen this eﬀect, though, by
locating further apart. However, Proposition 1 conﬁrms that the latter (indirect) eﬀect
is smaller than the former (direct) eﬀect. Consequently, an increase in the product price
leads to increased quality in equilibrium. There are similar mechanisms at work for the
comparative statics results regarding the other two parameters. When locations are en-
dogenous, the direct negative eﬀect on quality from an increase in t or k is partly mitigated
by a smaller distance between the ﬁrms in equilibrium, resulting in stronger incentives for
quality investments. The overall eﬀect, though, is a decrease in the equilibrium levels of
quality.
4 Optimal price regulation
In this section we analyse how a regulator should optimally set the price in this particular
market. The desirability of price regulation can arise for several reasons. Importantly, in
this type of model, allowing for price competition generally leads to both suboptimal equi-
librium levels of quality and socially ineﬃcient locations, due to the strategic interaction
between the ﬁrms. This could, in itself, create a potential role for regulation. However,
we also want to treat this model as a depiction of markets in which price regulation is
viewed as desirable due to e.g. distributional considerations or the presence of insurance,
like in health care markets.
The vertical and horizontal dimensions of the product (quality and locations) are
assumed to be non-contractible,13 leaving the product price as the only regulatory instru-
ment. We assume that the regulator maximises the sum of consumers’ and producers’
surpluses.14 Because of the symmetric features of the model, the ﬁrst-best solution must
13Due to measurement problems related to vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation, these variables will
typically be non-veriﬁable in a contractual sense.
14If we interpret the model in the context of health care markets with third-party payers, this particular
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also necessarily be symmetric. Setting q1 = q2 = q and x2 = 1−x1, social welfare is given
by
(10) W = q (1− 2kq) + t (6∆x1 − 1)
12
− c.
4.1 The ﬁrst-best solution
For comparative purposes, we start out by considering the socially optimal ﬁrst-best
solution. With the assumption of unit demand, there is no eﬃciency loss associated with
a price in excess of marginal costs, so that the only relevant variables are locations and
quality. The ﬁrst-best solutions are easily calculated as15
(11) xfb1 =
1
4
, xfb2 =
3
4
and
(12) qfb1 = q
fb
2 =
1
4k
.
The ﬁrst-best solution is characterised by a pair of locations that minimises total
transportation costs for consumers. When consumers are uniformly distributed on the
line segment [0, 1], this pair of locations is given by
(
1
4
, 3
4
)
. The ﬁrst-best solution also
requires a quality level that equates marginal revenues and marginal costs.
4.2 The second-best solution
When the regulator is not able to control locations and quality directly but only indirectly
through the price level, the equilibrium outcome is generally expected to fall short of the
ﬁrst-best solution. Before scrutinising whether this is indeed the case, we will ﬁrst consider
the case of exogenous locations.
speciﬁcation of the welfare function relies implicitly on the assumption that the third party (i.e. the
regulator) is able to raise the necessary funds in a non-distortionary manner.
15The second-order conditions are satisﬁed, since ∂
2W
∂x21
= −2t < 0, ∂2W∂q2 = −4k < 0 and ∂
2W
∂x1∂q
= 0.
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4.2.1 Exogenous locations
If locations are exogenous, the socially optimal levels of quality can be achieved at all
possible locations by imposing the appropriate price level. For simplicity, we will consider
the case of symmetric locations. Substituting from (5) into (10), the ﬁrst-order conditions
for a welfare-maximising price p∗ is given by
∂W
∂p
=
∆t− (p− c)
4t2k∆2
= 0,
which yields16
(13) p∗ = c+∆t.
An almost trivial, yet important, observation is that optimal price regulation implies
a price in excess of marginal production costs. A positive mark-up is necessary in order
to induce the ﬁrms to undertake quality investments. More interesting, though, is the
following result:
Proposition 2 With exogenous symmetric locations, the optimal regulated price is an
increasing function of the distance between the ﬁrms.
Proof. Follows immediately from (13).
The intuition is relatively straightforward. Although the distance between the ﬁrms
inﬂuences the incentives for quality investments, the socially optimal level of product
quality is independent of locations. For a given price, the further apart the ﬁrms are
located, the less intense quality competition, and consequently, the lower the equilibrium
levels of quality. The regulator can stimulate quality investments by increasing the price
and this increases the marginal revenue of such investments. Thus, the further apart the
ﬁrms are located, the higher the price that is required to provide the ﬁrms with suﬃcient
incentives to invest at the socially optimal quality level.
16The second-order condition is satisﬁed since ∂
2W
∂p2 = − 14kt2∆2 < 0.
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4.2.2 Endogenous locations
If the ﬁrms are able to choose their locations, the regulator must take into account how the
regulated price aﬀects not only quality but also the choice of locations. From Proposition
1 we know that a higher price induces higher quality and more horizontal diﬀerentiation.
Before solving explicitly for the optimal price, we can use the previously established results
to characterise the second-best solution. Assuming the Nash equilibrium to be symmetric
in locations, we are able to state the following:
Proposition 3 When locations are endogenous, the ﬁrst-best outcome is achieved only
if t = 1
k
. For t = 1
k
, the second-best outcome is characterised by (i) under-investment
in quality and too much diﬀerentiation if t < 1
k
, and (ii) over-investment in quality and
insuﬃcient diﬀerentiation if t > 1
k
.
Proof. Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order condition for an optimal
price p∗ is given by
(14)
∂W (x1 (p) , q (p))
∂p
=
∂W
∂x1
∂x1
∂p
+
∂W
∂q
∂q
∂p
= 0,
where x1 (p) and q (p) are given by (6) and (9), respectively. Denote the price that yields
ﬁrst-best locations by p̂. We can calculate this price by solving (6) for p with x1 = x
fb
1 =
1
4
.
This yields p̂ = c+ 1
2
kt2. Inserting p = p̂ into (9), we ﬁnd the equilibrium quality at this
price to be q (p̂) = 1
4
t. Comparing with the ﬁrst-best level of quality, from (12), we ﬁnd
that q (p̂)− qfb = tk−1
4k
. Thus,
(15) q (p̂) < (>) qfb if t < (>)
1
k
.
Consider the case of t > 1
k
. Since q (p̂) > qfb, this means that ∂W
∂q
< 0 at q = q (p̂). From
Proposition 1 we also know that ∂x1
∂p
< 0 and ∂q
∂p
> 0. Furthermore, at x1 = x
fb
1 it follows
that ∂W
∂x1
= 0. Thus, we have that
(16)
∂W
∂x1
∂x1
∂p
+
∂W
∂q
∂q
∂p
< 0 at p = p̂.
Consequently, no p can ensure that ∂W
∂x1
= ∂W
∂q
= 0. For the ﬁrst-order condition to hold,
the ﬁrst term in (16) must be positive. This can only be achieved by setting p < p̂, which
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yields x1 > x
fb
1 and implies that
∂W
∂x1
< 0. The second-best outcome is thus achieved by
setting a price p∗ where ∂W
∂x1
< 0 and ∂W
∂q
< 0 at the equilibrium pair (x1 (p
∗) , q (p∗)),
implying x1 (p
∗) > xfb1 and q (p
∗) > qfb. By symmetry, the opposite result applies for
t < 1
k
, and the ﬁrst-best outcome is only achieved at t = 1
k
.
In general, ﬁrst-best locations can only be achieved at the cost of a suboptimal level of
quality from a social welfare viewpoint, and vice versa. Consequently, the regulator faces a
trade-oﬀ between quality and horizontal diﬀerentiation in implementing the second-best
solution. Proposition 3 states that if it is suﬃciently costly to improve the quality of
the product, or if it is suﬃciently costly for consumers to ‘travel’, then the second-best
solution is characterised by too much quality and insuﬃcient diﬀerentiation. Conversely,
if k or t are suﬃciently low, the opposite result applies.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the price p = c as a candidate
optimal price. In this case equilibrium quality will be zero and the ﬁrms will agglomerate
at the market centre. By increasing the price above c the regulator can induce the ﬁrms to
invest in a higher level of quality, and, as a response to increased quality competition, the
ﬁrms will also choose to diﬀerentiate horizontally, in order to dampen competition. We can
call this the ‘quality eﬀect’ and ‘centrifugal eﬀect’, respectively. Obviously, with an initial
situation of q = 0 and x1 = x2 =
1
2
, both these eﬀects will increase social welfare. The
characteristics of the second-best equilibrium depend inter alia on the relative strength
of these two eﬀects. If t is high, then the ‘centrifugal eﬀect’ is relatively weak, because
it only takes a small increase in the distance between the ﬁrms to dampen competition
considerably. Consequently, the price level necessary to induce ﬁrst-best locations is so
high that it provides incentives for over-investment in quality. This is also the case if k
is relatively high, but for partly diﬀerent reasons. If the cost of improving the quality of
the product is high, then the ﬁrst-best level of quality is relatively low. Thus, ﬁrst-best
quality incentives are achieved at a relatively low price and this is not high enough to
induce a suﬃcient degree of diﬀerentiation.
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Substituting from (6), (8) and (9) into (10), and maximising with respect to p, we ﬁnd
the following expression for the optimal price:17
(17) p∗ = c+
1
32
(
4t+ 6
(
t
k
) 1
2 (
Φ + Φ−1
))
,
where18
Φ =
(
(tk)
1
2 + (tk − 1) 12
) 1
3
.
The relationship between the cost parameters, t and k, and the optimal regulated
price is given by the following comparative statics result:
Proposition 4 The optimal price p∗ is increasing in t and decreasing in k.
A proof is given in the appendix.
The intuition behind these results is related to Proposition 1. Higher transportation
costs mean that the intensity in quality competition is reduced, since it then becomes
more diﬃcult to ‘steal’ market shares from the competitor, and the beneﬁts of quality
investments are thus decreased. This also implies that the ﬁrms’ incentives to diﬀerentiate
horizontally is reduced. Consequently, it is necessary to increase the regulated price in
order to counteract these eﬀects.
The negative relationship between the optimal price and the investment cost param-
eter, k, is not a straightforward result as there are contradicting forces at play. We know
from Proposition 1 that a higher cost of quality reduces the ﬁrms’ incentives for quality
investments and horizontal diﬀerentiation. Ceteris paribus, this should lead to a higher
optimal price. However, if quality investments become more costly, then the ﬁrst-best level
of product quality is reduced. Proposition 4 conﬁrms that the latter eﬀect dominates, so
that the optimal price is a decreasing function of k.
17The second-order condition is satisﬁed, since
∂2W
∂p2
= −
2
1
3
[
2k
1
3 (4 (p− c) + t) + 2 13 3 (t (p− c)) 13
]
72 (tk)
2
3 (p− c) 53
< 0
18It can be shown that
(
Φ+ Φ−1
)
= 2 cos θ3 , where θ = arccos (tk)
− 12 . Thus,
(
Φ+ Φ−1
) ∈ R for all
t, k ≥ 0, even though Φ is a complex number for t < 1k . See also the appendix.
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Tables A and B illustrate numerically how the equilibrium outcome under the optimal
regulatory regime depends on the parameters t and k. In Table A we show how the optimal
price, and the corresponding equilibrium values of quality, horizontal diﬀerentiation and
proﬁts, vary with t, when k and c are set equal to 1. The equivalent results for a ﬁxed
value of t is presented in Table B.
Higher transportation costs imply that the regulator has to increase the price in order
to increase quality investments. From Table A, we see that the ﬁrms are in some sense
over-compensated in the optimal regulatory regime, so that the level of product quality is
increasing in t. We also observe that, even though ﬁrms spend more resources on quality
investments, the price increase is suﬃciently large to secure higher proﬁts for higher values
of t.
A similar pattern is found in Table B. We see that the price eﬀect is the important one
in determining equilibrium proﬁts, so that a lower price means lower proﬁts, even though
the ﬁrms spend less resources on quality investments.
Table A: Equilibrium outcomes for c = 1, k = 1. Table B: Equilibrium outcomes for c = 1, t = 1.
t Price Quality Distance Proﬁts k Price Quality Distance Proﬁts
0.2 1.181 0.218 1.043 0.043 0.2 1.907 1.087 1.043 0.217
0.4 1.277 0.229 0.756 0.086 0.4 1.692 0.572 0.756 0.215
0.6 1.358 0.237 0.629 0.123 0.6 1.596 0.395 0.629 0.205
0.8 1.431 0.244 0.552 0.156 0.8 1.539 0.305 0.552 0.195
1 1.500 0.250 0.500 0.188 1 1.500 0.250 0.500 0.188
1.2 1.565 0.255 0.461 0.217 1.2 1. 471 0.213 0.461 0.181
1.4 1.628 0.260 0.431 0.246 1.4 1. 448 0.186 0.431 0.176
1.6 1.688 0.264 0.407 0.274 1.6 1. 430 0.165 0.407 0.171
1.8 1.746 0.268 0.386 0.301 1.8 1. 415 0.149 0.386 0.167
2 1.803 0.272 0.369 0.328 2 1. 402 0.136 0.369 0.164
5 Regulation versus competition
In this section we want to elaborate somewhat on the beneﬁts of price regulation in this
model, by contrasting the equilibrium derived in the previous sections with the case where
the ﬁrms are allowed to compete in prices.
15
For the case of price competition, we assume that the ﬁrms simultaneously set prices at
a new third stage of the game after locations and quality investments have been decided.
The choice of this particular timing of the game rests on the assumption that prices are
more ﬂexible than qualities.
We can simplify the exposition by assuming that the ﬁrms are conﬁned to choosing
locations within the market boundaries, i.e. that xi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2. Furthermore,
in order to secure an equilibrium in the location-quality-price game, we also make the
assumption that k > 2
9t
.
The case of price competition in this model is very similar to Economides (1989), so
the derivation of the full equilibrium will be kept fairly short. If pi is the price charged
by ﬁrm i, the indiﬀerent consumer is located at
(18) z˜ =
1
2
(x1 + x2) +
q1 − q2 − (p1 − p2)
2t (x2 − x1) ,
whereas proﬁts are given by
(19) πi = (pi − c) y˜i − kq2i , i = 1, 2,
where y˜1 = z˜ and y˜2 = 1− z˜.
Solving the game backwards, we derive the following expressions for prices and quality
levels as functions of locations:
(20) p1 =
c− t [x2 − x1] [9ck + 3tk (2 + x2 + x1) (x2 − x1)− 1]
1− 9tk (x2 − x1) ,
(21) p2 =
c+ t [x2 − x1] [1 + 3tk (x1 + x2 − 4) (x2 − x1)− 9ck]
1− 9tk (x2 − x1) ,
(22) q1 =
1− 3tk (2 + x1 + x2) (x2 − x1)
6k [1− 9tk (x2 − x1)] ,
and
(23) q2 =
1 + 3tk (x1 + x2 − 4) (x2 − x1)
6k [1− 9tk (x2 − x1)] .
Due to the symmetric nature of the model, we can focus attention towards symmetric
locations. The partial derivative of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function with respect to its own location
16
(x1), evaluated at x2 = 1− x1, is given by
∂π1
∂x1
= −(72tx
2
1k − 18ktx1 + 2x1 − 9kt+ 2) t
6 [1 + 9kt (2x1 − 1)] .
It is easily conﬁrmed that ∂π1
∂x1
< 0 for all x1 ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
when k > 2
9t
. Thus, equilibrium
locations are given by x∗1 = 0, x
∗
2 = 1. In other words, price competition induces maximal
horizontal diﬀerentiation, with the ﬁrms locating at the market borders. This result
mirrors Economides (1989).
Inserting the equilibrium locations into (20)-(23), we obtain the following simple ex-
pressions for prices and qualities:
(24) pi = c+ t,
(25) qi =
1
6k
.
Comparing (12) and (25), we observe that, compared with the socially optimal level,
price competition does not yield suﬃcient incentives for quality investments.19 This is
due to the strategic eﬀect of quality investments on price competition. If a ﬁrm improves
the quality of its product, the competing ﬁrm has a stronger incentive to reduce prices
in order to mitigate the loss of market share. Consequently, the ﬁrms can dampen price
competition by oﬀering lower-quality products.20
In a similar model with ﬁxed locations, Ma and Burgess (1993) show that price
competition yields sub-optimal quality levels if there are some ﬁxed (i.e. production-
independent) costs associated with quality investments. This provides a rationale for
price regulation. A quite simple, but still important, point that can be added within
the context of the present model is that endogenous locations provide a second argument
for price regulation. Since price competition yields too much horizontal diﬀerentiation,
locational eﬃciency can be improved by introducing a ﬁxed (regulated) price.
19This result is, in fact, more general, since it is easily conﬁrmed that (25) holds for any exogenous
symmetric location x2 = 1− x1.
20This strategy is somewhat related to the classic ‘puppy-dog ploy’ introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984).
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The isolated eﬀect of price regulation can perhaps be seen most clearly by letting a
regulator impose a price level equal to the equilibrium price that would emerge if the
ﬁrms were allowed to compete on prices.
Inserting p = c+ t into (5) yields
(26) q∗i =
1
4k∆
.
Comparing (25) and (26) we see that the eﬀect of regulation per se is an increase in
quality. Furthermore, by inserting p = c+ t into (8) we obtain
(27) ∆∗ =
(
1
4tk
) 1
3
.
We see that ∆∗ is strictly less than 1 if t > 1
4k
. Thus, price regulation does not only provide
higher-quality products, it also ensures improved locational eﬃciency for a substantial set
of parameter values.
From this exercise we see that the beneﬁts of price regulation do not only emerge from
the eﬀects of a lower price level. Even if regulation does not change the product price,
there are isolated beneﬁts of using regulation as a means of preventing price competition.
By eradicating competition along one dimension (prices), the strategic responses of the
ﬁrms ensure a higher degree of competition along other dimensions (quality and location).
6 Partial commitment
Before the paper is concluded, let us brieﬂy discuss the issue of regulatory commitment.
So far we have assumed that the regulator is able to commit to a particular regulatory
regime at the start of the game, before the ﬁrms make their decisions. However, in some
circumstances (e.g. in the absence of long-term contracts), this may not be the most
plausible assumption. When full commitment is not possible for the regulator, we may
suspect that the equilibrium outcome will be quite diﬀerent and perhaps less desirable
from a welfare point of view.
In this section we focus on the case of partial commitment, where the regulator is not
able to commit to a price before ﬁrms decide on locations. Thus, the following game is
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considered: at stage one ﬁrms choose locations; at stage two the regulator sets the price;
ﬁnally, at stage three, ﬁrms choose the level of quality.
From the discussion in Section 4 we know that the regulator in this case will set a
price that induces a socially optimal supply of quality. This price is given by (13), with
the corresponding equilibrium quality levels given by (12).
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, each ﬁrm simultaneously chooses its location, antici-
pating the optimal regulated price. Solving the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximisation problems with
p = c+∆t and qi =
1
4k
, we ﬁnd a unique pair of equilibrium locations, given by
x1 = 0 and x2 = 1.
Thus, each ﬁrm locates at one end of the Hotelling-line if they can pre-commit to a
location before the regulator sets the price, or conversely, if the regulator is unable to
commit to a price before ﬁrms decide on locations. Note that this equilibrium outcome
is not dependent on whether or not we allow the ﬁrms to locate outside the market.21
Since the regulator chooses a price schedule which implements ﬁrst-best quality irre-
spective of the ﬁrms’ locational choices, the incentives to diﬀerentiate horizontally are not
caused by a desire to avoid ﬁerce head-on quality competition, as in the previous sections.
Horizontal diﬀerentiation is rather a strategy for ﬁrms to achieve a higher regulated price,
since the optimal price is increasing in distance.
However, the incentives for diﬀerentiation is still limited by the standard market share
eﬀect which in the model represents a centripetal force. A unilateral relocation away from
the market centre by one of the ﬁrms implies, ceteris paribus, a loss of market share to
the other ﬁrm. The size of this loss is larger the further away from the market centre a
ﬁrm is located. Consequently, when ﬁrms decide locations non-cooperatively, there are
two counteracting forces which prevent locations outside the market borders.
The equilibrium locations yield an equilibrium regulated price
p = c+ t,
21In the product space interpretation of the model, locations outside the market borders mean that
the ﬁrms oﬀer product variants that do not correspond with the ideal variant of any consumer. This is
also a way to portray, albeit rather crudely, a certain degree of consumer concentration in the market.
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which is incidentally equal to the equilibrium price under price competition when ﬁrms
are restricted to locate within the market borders (cf. (24)). This is also true for the
equilibrium locations. Consequently, even if full regulatory commitment is not possi-
ble regulation is still socially beneﬁcial because the supply of quality is more eﬃcient.
However, social welfare under partial commitment will be (weakly) lower than under full
commitment. The reason is straightforward: under full commitment, the regulator can
always pick the same policy as under partial commitment. The regulator’s ability to trade
oﬀ quality beneﬁts against locational beneﬁts enables her to improve social welfare.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed the strategic interaction between ﬁrms’ choices of product
quality and location in a spatial duopoly that is subject to price regulation. When the
ﬁrms are unable to compete in prices, the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation is determined
by the intensity of quality competition, which in turn is determined by the ﬁrms’ price-cost
margins and by transportation and investment costs.
We have derived the socially optimal price under the assumption of pre-commitment
by the regulator, and ﬁnd that the ﬁrst-best solution will generally not be achieved. If
consumers’ transportation costs or the cost of quality investments are above a certain
threshold level, compared with the ﬁrst-best solution optimal price regulation yields over-
investment in quality and an insuﬃcient degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation.
In real life, price regulation is often motivated by a desire to avoid excessively high
prices in markets with a low degree of competition. This is not an issue in our model.
Instead we have focused on the potential beneﬁts of price regulation purely as a means
of avoiding price competition. We have identiﬁed two diﬀerent eﬃciency gains of regula-
tion. In addition to the positive eﬀect on quality investments which has previously been
pointed out by Ma and Burgess (1993), we have also provided a second argument for
the desirability of price regulation, namely that locational eﬃciency will in most cases be
improved.
There are obviously several well known arguments against price regulation. Most of
20
these are related to potential problems caused by asymmetric information. It should
therefore be stressed that this paper does not address such issues. We have instead
focused exclusively on the strategic implications of price regulation in a world of perfect
information. In an overall evaluation of the desirability of introducing, or upholding,
price regulation in a particular industry, the potential eﬃciency gains identiﬁed in this
paper should therefore be weighed against the potential problems that have been adressed
elsewhere.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
From (17) we can derive the following comparative statics expressions:
(A.1)
∂p∗
∂t
=
1
32
[
4 + 3 (tk)−
1
2
(
Φ + Φ−1
)
+ (tk − 1)− 12 (Φ− Φ−1)]
(A.2)
∂p∗
∂k
= − 1
32
[
3 (tk)
1
2 k−2
(
Φ + Φ−1
)− t
k
(tk − 1)− 12 (Φ− Φ−1)]
We have to show that ∂p
∗
∂t
> 0 and ∂p
∗
∂k
< 0 for all t > 0, k > 0. Assume ﬁrst that
t > 1
k
. In this case Φ is a positive real number, and (Φ− Φ−1) > 0 is a suﬃcient condition
for ∂p
∗
∂t
> 0. Inserting the expression for Φ yields
Φ− Φ−1 =
(
(tk)
1
2 + (tk − 1) 12
) 2
3 − 1(
(tk)
1
2 + (tk − 1) 12
) 1
3
,
which is unambiguously positive for t > 1
k
.
Inserting the expression for Φ in (A.2) yields
(A.3)
∂p∗
∂k
= − 1
32
[
A+ tk +B
2
3 (A− tk)
(tk − 1) 12 B 13k2
]
,
where
A = 3 (tk)
1
2 (tk − 1) 12
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and
B = (tk)
1
2 + (tk − 1) 12
The denominator in the square brackets of (A.3) is always positive for t > 1
k
, and we
see that the numerator is minimized for t → 1
k
. It is easily checked, however, that the
numerator approaches zero as t→ 1
k
. Thus, ∂p
∗
∂k
< 0 for t > 1
k
.
Now assume that t < 1
k
. In this case Φ /∈ R, and can be expressed as
Φ =
(
(tk)
1
2 + (1− tk) 12 i
) 1
3
.
Furthermore, we have that
(tk)
1
2 + (1− tk) 12 i = cos θ + i sin θ,
where
(A.4) θ = arccos (tk)
1
2 .
Note that θ is a positive real number for t < 1
k
. By De Moivre’s Theorem we have that
(A.5) Φ = cos
θ
3
+ i sin
θ
3
.
We can then use (A.5) to compute
(A.6) Φ + Φ−1 = 2 cos
θ
3
.
Similarly, for t < 1
k
we have that
(tk − 1)− 12 (Φ− Φ−1) = (1− tk)− 12 i (Φ− Φ−1) ,
which, by the use of (A.5) and the fact that (1− tk) 12 = sin θ, reduces to
2 sin θ
3
sin θ
.
We can thus rewrite (A.1) and (A.2) as
(A.7)
∂p∗
∂t
=
1
32
[
4 + 6 (tk)−
1
2 cos
θ
3
+
2 sin θ
3
sin θ
]
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and
(A.8)
∂p∗
∂k
= − 1
32
[
6 (tk)
1
2 k−2 cos
θ
3
− t
k
(
2 sin θ
3
sin θ
)]
It follows immediately that ∂p
∗
∂t
> 0 for t < 1
k
.
Using (A.4), and deﬁning a = tk, we can rewrite (A.8) as
∂p∗
∂k
= −Ωk
−2a
1
2
32
,
where
Ω = 3a
1
2 (1− a) 12 cos
(
1
3
arccos a
1
2
)
− a sin
(
1
3
arccos a
1
2
)
.
It follows that ∂p
∗
∂k
< 0 if Ω > 0. Solving Ω = 0 we ﬁnd that this equation has two roots:
a = 0 and a = 1. Due to continuity, we can determine the sign of Ω by inserting numerical
values for a. By this method it is easily conﬁrmed that Ω > 0 for a ∈ (0, 1). It follows
that Ω > 0, and thus ∂p
∗
∂k
< 0, for t < 1
k
.
It only remains to check the sign of ∂p
∗
∂t
and ∂p
∗
∂k
for t = 1
k
. Using either (A.1)-(A.2) or
(A.7)-(A.8), it is easily conﬁrmed that limt→ 1
k
∂p∗
∂t
= 1
3
> 0 and limt→ 1
k
∂k∗
∂t
= − 1
6k2
< 0. 
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